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Abstract 
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute beliefs to oneself and others. 
The present study used a dynamic systems approach to assess how environment may affect 
the development of second-order ToM (e.g., John knows that Mary knows that he went out 
yesterday). ToM is divided into two major dimensions: comprehension (i.e., to understand a 
mental state) and prediction (i.e., to predict someone else’s future behaviour or mental state). 
Two age groups were assessed: 5-6 and 10-11 years old children. In both age groups, 
participants were assigned to a condition of “Support” (help provided) or “Non-Support” 
(help not provided).  
Results show that second-order ToM follows a dynamic growth law that depends on 
support. Support facilitates performance in ToM production (i.e., to predict one’s future 
behaviour) for both the 5-6 and 10-11 year old children. Interestingly, the 5-6 year olds who 
received support presented an increase in the second-order prediction performance at the 
expense of the second-order comprehension, suggesting that a temporary dip in 
comprehension performance may facilitate the development of mental rules to predict one’s 
future behaviour. 
Keywords 
Development of Second Order Theory of Mind; Dynamic Systems; Environmental 
Influences; Comprehension of Mental States; Prediction of Mental States. 
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Theory of Mind (ToM) comprises both cognitive and emotional aspects necessary for 
the understanding of someone’s thoughts and behaviour. More cognate aspects, however, 
allow the binding of relevant information to render an event (e.g., somebody’s behaviour) 
comprehensible (Frith, 1989), which notably involves the use of executive functions (EFs; 
see Müller, Liebermann-Finestone, Carpendale, Hammond, & Bibok, 2012).This allows the 
attribution of mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, emotions) to oneself and others, but also 
involves the use of these mental states to predict and explain one self’s behaviour as well as 
others’ (see Imuta, 2016; Mitchell, 1997).The ability to mentalise is not a unique human 
ability (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), and even primates such as orangutans and chimpanzees 
are able to distinguish intentional behaviour from accidental actions(see for instance Call & 
Tomasello, 2008; see also Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003). 
In humans, ToM normally develops following a certain path (see Wellman, 1990; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008): from an implicit 
and basic theory of others’ desires and intentions to a more explicit belief theory, where a 
progression of new conceptual insights generalise and modify its structure and functioning. 
For instance, the ability to understand true beliefs is followed by the understanding of false 
beliefs, or an understanding of first-order beliefs leads to an understanding of second-order 
beliefs and so on (see also Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Although understanding false beliefs is considered to be a strong indicator of ToM 
development, research has shown that even infants possess a rudimentary ability to 
understand the mind of others (see for instance Slaughter, 2015). Moreover, older children 
can understand both lies and deception, which enables more complexity in strategy in late 
adolescence and early adulthood (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Peterson & 
Siegal, 2002; Vetter, Leipold, Kliegel, Phillips, & Altgassen, 2013; Valle et al., 2015). 
However, a clear change in the understanding of false beliefs can be observed in 3 to 6 year 
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olds who are typically developing and become able to distinguish between someone’s beliefs 
and their own, and to understand the intention and belief of a person (Astington & Gopnik, 
1991; Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschrager, 2002; Saxe, 
Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Mitchell & Riggs, 2000; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Wellman, 1991). 
This change in ToM development is supported by dynamic systems and physiological 
studies revealing that changes around 6 years of age coincide with a move from simpler 
thought processes towards more coordinated ones (Case, 1991; Fischer & Bidell, 2006). One 
possibility is that in young children ToM is mainly based on an innate biological form of 
empathy which progresses into a more cognate form of ToM understanding from the age of 
3-4 (Low, 2015; Preston & de Waal, 2002). 
More complex forms of ToM emerging at this age can be observed in the dynamic 
system literature associated to regressions, that is, when an ability (or component of) is 
temporarily impaired concomitantly with the emergence or refinement of another (see Blijd-
Hoogewys, 2008; Blijd-Hoogewy, Van Geert, Serra, & Minderaa, 2008). This supports the 
idea that for an ability to develop, others may temporarily suffer from it in order for this 
ability to make its way in the cognitive skillset of an individual. 
Furthermore, changes in ToM complexity at this age might not be the result of ToM 
development per se, and other cognitive components may play a role. Another possibility is 
that since the switch from an implicit to a more explicit form of ToM may involve conscious 
thought and action, then executive functions might play a role (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). 
This implies the use of EFs in synergy with language and working memory (see Apperly, 
Samson, & Humphreys, 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Mutter, Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006). 
Thus, the concomitant development of EFs and language abilities may facilitate the switch 
Dynamic Systems and ToM 
 
5 
from an implicit to an explicit ToM (San Juan & Astington, 2012), though this can be 
hindered in the presence of an implicit ToM deficit as found in children with autism spectrum 
disorder (Schuwerk, 2015). 
This is particularly important for higher levels of ToM recursivity (i.e., second- and 
third-order nested belief), where an increasingly more complex meta-representational 
workload is necessary: ‘I think that you think that s/he thinks [second order] that another 
person thinks [third order]’. A typical adult is able to follow only a few levels of recursions, 
and often loses track at the 2
nd
 or 3
rd
 level (Verbrugge & Mol, 2008; see also Valle, Massaro, 
Castelli, & Marchetti, 2015; Miller, 2012; and the pioneering study of Perner & Wimmer, 
1985). 
Our study examined short-term dynamic processes that might lead to long-term 
changes in the ability of children to master ToM. We assessed the effect of interacting with 
an expert adult on children’s ToM strategies for the understanding of someone’s beliefs, 
emotions or intentions (i.e., ‘ToM comprehension’), and the ability to actively make a 
prediction of one’s future behaviour or mental state (see Figure 1). This distinction is similar 
to what has been proposed as implicit and explicit ToM respectively (see Low & Perner, 
2012).  
Since conflict inhibition is measured by EFs tasks then  the emergence of false belief 
understanding may be the precursor of the children’s ability to predict a conflict between 
their own and somebody else’s perspective, such as the scenarios faced by children whilst 
they are playing PC games (i.e., Strategic Game, see Methods). The acquisition of false belief 
understanding correlated with substantial changes in EFs around the age of 6, involving 
inhibition of a dominant response   
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Figure 1. First- and second-order strategic game. In (a) top and bottom, the sequence of events in the 
support condition, whereas (b) illustrates the game in the condition without support (i.e., absence of explicit 
request for the prediction of the opponent’s behaviour). (c) Displays the second-order Strategic Game. 
Participants are required to think which direction the PC opponent will go at the second junction.  
 
and the subsequent initiation of a subdominant response, which reflects the scenario present 
in the Strategic Game (see for instance the discussion in Müller, Liebermann-Finestone, 
Carpendale, Hammond, & Bibok, 2012). 
Dynamic Systems have been used in different domains to study how 
elements/individuals influence each other on a given timescale, leading to self-organisation 
processes (Thelen & Smith, 1996; Witherington, 2015). One way to address these dynamics 
is to use coupled equation approaches to model one-to-one dyadic interaction such as parent-
child or teacher-child relationships through childhood, but also during adolescence and early 
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adulthood (several implementations can be found in Van Geert, 1994; Steenbeek & van 
Geert, 2007; Steenbeek & van Geert, 2008; Hamaker et al., 2009; Steele & Ferrer, 2011; 
Butner et al., 2007). 
In this study the theoretical framework of one of these dyadic interaction models 
(Steenbeek & van Geert, 2007; Steenbeek & van Geert, 2008) was used to interpret 
interactions between the ability to understand and predict mental states. The application of 
dynamic systems to the development of ToM is not common and formal modelling of social 
interaction which plays a crucial role in ToM development is scarce (Hughes, 2011; Hughes 
& Leekam, 2004; Pavarini, de Holland Souza, &Hawk, 2013; Hayashi, 2007).  
These systems are driven by two different types of parameters: order parameters, 
macroscopic/dominant variables that reflect dominant modes of the interactive system as a 
whole. These parameters emerge from the interaction/coordination of a second type of 
microscopic parameters, called control parameters: they represent all forms of coordination 
that the elements of the system can allow (for a discussion see Thelen & Smith, 1996; 
Steenbeek & van Geert, 2008). 
In our framework, ToM development can be conceived as the result of an interaction 
between two order parameters (ToM comprehension and prediction of mental states) and 
three control parameters (i.e., environment, growth rate and carrying capacity). In dyadic 
systems, the interplay between these two sets of parameters appears to occur through a causal 
circular process both in the short- and long-term (i.e., respectively comprehension and 
prediction), where aspects of daily comprehension of mental state and behaviour have a long-
term effect on the ability to predict someone’s behaviour/mental state. Figure 2 gives an 
outline of the order and control parameters on both short- and long-term time scale in our 
model of interaction framework. 
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Figure 2. The framework used to present the interaction between the coupled variables “ToM 
Comprehension” and “ToM Prediction”. Interaction with the environment supplies a valuable help to enable a 
subject to comprehend a certain level of mental representation. This information, in turn, can be used in social 
strategies to facilitate subjects in predicting other’s mental states or behaviour. The effect these strategies have 
on agents in social contexts leads to changes in the social environment to which subjects are exposed.  
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Long-term changes in ToM prediction influence the interaction with the environment, 
a control parameter situated on a short-term time scale; interaction with peers and expert 
figures determine changes in the ToM comprehension level of a child in the short-term, and 
this in turn influences the ability to predict mental states (ToM prediction), an order 
parameter that changes on a long-term scale. This order parameter is controlled by control 
parameters such as the environment, the speed at which the performance grows, and a 
performance limit depending on the subject’s personal capability (i.e., carrying capacity). In 
other words, in the long-term subjects’ comprehension of mental states affects their 
prediction rules to predict future mental states and behaviours. Since ToM has a recursive 
nature (i.e., mental states can be nested at several levels of recursivity), this framework has 
the potential to explain the interplay between comprehension and prediction at any ToM 
order, as well as transitions from one level to another (i.e., first- to second-order ToM). 
Although the relationship between support and development of second-order ToM has 
already been the focus of research (see for instance, Hayashi, 2007), dynamic system research 
in developmental psychology has not yet addressed the dynamics between different modes of 
ToM use (i.e., comprehension/prediction) and the effects of the environment. In order to 
study environmental influences on comprehension and prediction of second-order mental 
states, two conditions were designed. Since more complex phenomena (e.g., ToM second-
order predictions) can be observed compared to an environment where support is minimal 
(see for instance, Fischer & Bidell, 2006), a functional level (i.e., condition with support) can 
be observed in given skill domain (e.g. ToM) when a child is given low support and allowed 
to work on his/her own. This allows us to observe the highest skill level that a child can 
achieve by his/herself. Conversely, an optimal level (i.e., condition with support) is achieved 
when high support is provided. These two conditions allow to measure the two upper limits 
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of the child’s performance, that is the best performance obtainable without support and the 
best achievable with support. 
Two age groups were assessed: 5-6 and 10-11 year olds. We predicted that although 
both age groups may be already capable of taking a second-order perspective (i.e., second-
order comprehension acquired), 5-6 year old children may be poor to predict someone’s 
future behaviour in a task where second-order ToM prediction is required. Conversely, for 
the 10-11 year olds, we would expect minimal second-order ToM differences between the 
two environmental conditions, since this group of participants is assumed as control group, 
and should present small differences irrespective of the environmental conditions. Crucially, 
the help supplied in the condition with support should influence the comprehension-
prediction dynamic relation in a way that improves second-order ToM prediction rules to 
predict another person’s behaviour, with larger differences for the 5-6 year olds than the 10-
11 year olds. 
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Methods 
Stimuli and Procedure 
A set of tests assessed the ability to mentalise first- and second-order ToM 
comprehension and prediction. False-belief stories were used to assess the ability of a child to 
understand that a character’s action might be based on a wrong belief. Thus, a child will 
present a correct belief whereas the character has a false belief. Stories were read while at the 
same time drawings were shown to illustrate the various elements of the story. Children 
experience this type of assessment as a ‘being read to’ activity, rather than a ‘being tested’ 
activity (Blijd-Hoogewys & van Geert, 2017). To assess prediction of mental states, two PC 
games (Strategic Games) were developed. These were sequential games that are particularly 
suitable for use with children because of the attractiveness of its audiovisual components. 
First- and second-level of recursion were measured for both comprehension and 
prediction (e.g., “John knows that Mary [first order] knows that [second order] he did not go 
to school yesterday”) by using parallel forms of false belief stories (Flobbe, 2006; Flobbe, 
Verbrugge, Hendriks, & Krämer, 2008; Blijd-Hoogewys, 2008), and computer 
games(Flobbe, 2006; Flobbe et al., 2008; further details are provided in the Supplemental 
Methods). 
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Design 
A mini version of a cross-sectional microgenetic study was adopted. Models have 
already been validated with only three repeated observations (see for example: Van Geert & 
Steenbeek, 2005ab; Vleioras, Van Geert, & Bosma, 2008). A mixed design was implemented 
with one within-subjects factor (session: three weekly testing sessions) and two between-
subjects factors (age groups: 5-6, 10-11 year olds; and environmental condition: support, non-
support). Environmental effects for the prediction tests were assessed using t-tests with 
theoretical distribution correction (see supplemental Methods), whereas for the dynamic 
system fitting a dynamic hyperlogistic model used in a wide variety of fields (see Banks, 
1994; Van Geert, 1991;Fischer & Bidell, 2006) was implemented. The model provides 
restricted and exponential growth equations as a function of time to explain ToM 
development (Figure 3), that is special cases that can be derived from its general formula to 
fit different growth patterns: 
∆𝐿𝑡
∆𝑡
= 𝑟 ∙ 𝐿𝑡
𝑝 ∙ (1 − 𝑑 ∙ 𝐿𝑡
𝑠)𝑞  Equation 1 
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Figure 3. Graphical illustration of restricted and exponential restricted growths. In an ideal scenario, 
Growth (y-axis) shows a quick or slow increases as a function of time (x-axis). Note: the temporal scale 
represented in the figure is arbitrary: it can indicate the number of hours or the number of days, months or years 
as well. The same applies for the growth. Analogously, growth can be assessed by the performance to a 
psychometric test, in terms of accuracy, reaction times, etc. 
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Goodness-of-fit for the dynamic models derived from Equation 1 were assessed using 
a G
2
 test statistic. 
The study comprised three weekly sessions and tests were administered in the 
following order: 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order comprehension test, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order prediction test. The 
entire session took 50 minutes and was terminated if the participant exceeded this limit (a 
zero score was given to the missing item).Since the format of our set of tests was different 
(i.e., stories and games) two distinctive modes of support were implemented. For false belief 
stories support was provided by repeating crucial details - what has happened and what has 
not been understood by the child over the stream of events. During prediction tests, support 
was supplied by providing a further explanation of the strategies used by the opponent when 
the subject was unable to predict the opponent’s intentions. Conversely, when support was 
not supplied, subjects were expected to master first- and second-order mental states: support 
was not provided and children were assumed to be able to understand false beliefs and to 
actively produce a prediction of the opponent’s behaviour on their own. (Further details for 
the assessment of the environmental effects and the dynamic system implementation are 
provided in the Supplemental Methods). 
Participants 
Two groups of subjects completed the study: 5-6 year old children from a primary 
school (𝑛1 = 12) and 10-11 year old children from a middle high school (𝑛2 = 12). Each 
age group was divided in two subgroups and children were randomly assigned to either the 
support or unsupported condition. 
The schools were two well-established public schools (Tuscany, Italy) who welcomed 
the project and helped to recruit families for the project. Parents signed a written informed 
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consent and all sessions were audio-recorded; consent for the audio-recording was obtained 
separately. The educational background of the parents was mixed. First-order ToM was used 
as exclusion criterion and pupils were screened for their ability to use first-order ToM; 
however, none of the recruited subjects met this exclusion (see Supplemental Methods for 
further details on screening).  
The mean age of the 5-6 age group was 6.26 year (median = 6.25; range 5 years and 
11 months to 6 years and 9 months) and the mean age of the 10-11 age group was 11.24 year 
(median = 11.25; range = 10 years and 10 months to 12 years and 4 months). An equal 
number of females and males was allocated in each age group and subgroups (i.e., conditions 
with and without support). 
Result 
In order to assess the main effect of support for ToM comprehension and prediction t-
tests were carried out irrespective of the ToM order (i.e., first- and second-order), and of the 
weekly session. 
The proportion of correct answers (𝑝) wasobtained for each subject and converted to 
its corresponding t-value. These t-values were first used to check for guesswork: both sub-
groups (i.e., condition with and without support) and age groups answered significantly away 
from the theoretical distribution (all p-values < .001). Next, independent t-test compared the 
condition with support (supported condition) and without support (unsupported condition). In 
order to account for the different variance between the groups, Welch’s correction was used. 
The 5-6 year olds in the supported group were 12% more accurate in the 
comprehension tests compared to the unsupported group (participants in the supported 
condition may improve their accuracy up to 24%; the mean proportion difference was 
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. 94 − .82 = .12 ×  100 = 12%; t(26.51) = 2.25, p<.05, CI95= .01, .24). Support appears to help 
subjects improve their ToM skills. The 10-11 age sub-group who received support was 4% 
more accurate than the unsupported counter-group (i.e., 1 − .96 = .4 ×  100 = 4%), but this 
result was non-significant (t(17) = 1.37, p =.18, CI95 = -.01, .08; means: SC = 1,UC = .96; H0: true 
diff. in means = 0). This is because the second-order ToM comprehension is strongly 
consolidated in the 10-11 years olds. 
Differences between the condition with and without support were also analysed for 
the ToM prediction tests. The 5-6 year olds benefited when support was received. Those who 
were assigned to the condition with support scored 28% better than those who did not receive 
support (i.e., [. 73 − .70] − [. 50 − .25] = .28 × 100 = 28%). An independent t-test, showed that 
with 95% confidence level participants who received support perform up to 13% better than 
those in the unsupported condition (t(28.68) = 5.67, p< .001, CI95 = -.07, .13; means SC = .73, UC 
= .70; H0: true diff. in means = -.25). Figure 4 depicts statistical and empirical distributions for 
the prediction tests. 
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Figure 4. The theoretical (in black) and empirical probability distribution (e.g. proportion of mean accuracy; in 
grey for support and no support) for the ToM prediction tests (i.e., number of trial items per game: 36). On the 
left: distributions for the condition with support are shown. On the right: distributions for the condition without 
support. Top panel shows the 5-6 year olds whereas bottom panel the 10-11 year old group. 
Note: the analysis comprises collated data irrespective of the ToM order and of the weekly sessions (i.e., 1, 2, 
3), n = 18 per environmental condition (i.e., support/no-support), and n = 36 per age group (5-6/10-11 year 
olds). 
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A similar trend was found for the 10-11 year olds who received support, who scored 
31% higher than in the unsupported condition (i.e., [0.90 − .084] − [0.50 − 0.25] = 0.31 ×
 100 = 31%). An independent t-test confirmed that in statistical terms up to 12% of those 
children who received support performed better than the unsupported ones (t (31.11)= 10.52, 
p< .001, CI95 = .00, .12; means SC = .90, UC= .84, H0: true diff. in means = -.25). 
Overall, these results show that both age groups performed better in the condition 
with support, although the support received by the experimenter during the prediction tests 
appears to have a stronger impact on second-order prediction than comprehension. ToM at 
10-11 years of age is robust and allows subjects to complete the tasks, even without support; 
whereas, for the 5-6 years old children the second-order ToM is more transient: it shows an 
enhanced level when support is given but this increase is not observed in the unsupported 
condition.  
The dynamic fitting showed that both the restricted and the exponential models 
provide a good fit for the empirical data in both the conditions with and without support 
respectively (all p-values > .97; see Figure 5). Table 1 reports the estimates for the growth 
parameter.  Second-order ToM growth shows an accelerated trend in the first sessions in the 
condition with support at 5-6 years of age. We noticed an acceleration of the growth, (i.e. 
performance), in the supported compared to the unsupported condition for both age groups. 
However, it appears that the 5-6 year olds receive greater benefit from the support than the 
10-11 year olds.Minor differences –that decreased even further across the weekly sessions– 
were observed in the 10-11 age group. 
As to the differences between second-order comprehension and prediction, second-
order ToM comprehension diminished after initially having accelerated its growth it, and 
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generally growth was faster in the 5-6 year olds group who received support.In the condition 
without support for the same age groupal growth was slower and overall reached a lower 
level. Second-order ToM prediction was higher and faster in the 5-6 year olds who received 
support (see Figure 5 top), whilst performance remained more around chance level (p=.5) and 
somewhat slower in the same age group who did not receive support. 
In the 10-11 years of age group, second-order ToM is robust and allows subjects to 
complete the tasks irrespective of the second-order ToM dimensions and whether or not they 
receive support; whereas, for the 5-6 years old children the second-order ToM is more 
transient: it shows an enhanced level when support is given but this increase is not observed 
in the condition without support. 
Interestingly, concomitantly with a decrease in second-order comprehension, an 
increase of second-order prediction in the supported condition for the 5-6 age group (see 
Figure 6) was observed, which may suggest a temporary regression. This pattern neither is 
present in the unsupported condition for the 5-6 year olds nor in the supported and 
unsupported conditions for the 10-11 age group. This offers support to the idea that the 5-6 
year olds in the condition with support benefit from the help supplied, although at the 
expense of a temporary decrease in second-order comprehension performance. 
In the condition with support, dynamic systems indicators such an increase in 
variability from session two to session three (from 0% to 8% for the 2
nd
 order 
comprehension; see Figure 5 top-left graph) together with a decrease in growth (i.e., a 
negative 𝑟′ parameter) may be indicative of an increase in cognitive resources consumption 
(hence the second-order comprehension dip), and may be used to demonstrate transitions in 
which an increase in the performance of one (developing) component, i.e., second-order 
prediction, occurs at the expense of another component, i.e., comprehension. 
Dynamic Systems and ToM 
 
20 
Furthermore, individual performance dynamic fitting was also carried out, showing 
similar results; however, not all the subjects presented a pattern that resembles the one 
obtained by averaging across subjects (i.e., not everyone showed a regression in the ability to 
understand mental states), though dynamic fitting on single individuals showed that learning 
to use second-order ToM follows dynamic rules for both comprehension and prediction of 
mental states (see Supplemental Results). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Accuracy proportions for empirical and predicted values ranging between 0 and 1 were transformed 
into t-values prior to plotting. Graphs depict the model fits and the empirical data through the three week 
sessions. The 5-6 year olds children are depicted at the top, while the 10-11 year olds at the bottom.   
Note: some conditions present an overlapped offset, hence they are partially visible; environmental conditions 
(i.e., support/non-support), n = 6 per condition, age group (i.e., 5-6/10-11 year olds), n = 12 per group. 
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Table 1. Summary of the parameter estimations for the two dynamic models fitted based on the average 
performance of the groups. Results shows that both second-order ToM components are fitted well by the 
restricted model and the exponential restricted model in the conditions with and without support respectively. 
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Figure 6. Cross-comparison between second-order ToM comprehension and prediction for the condition with 
support in the 5-6 year old group. Data show a decrease in performance for the second-order comprehension 
concurrent with an increase for the second-order prediction performance. 
Note: environmental condition (i.e., support – one condition), n = 6 per weekly session (i.e., 1,2,3), age group 
(i.e., 1 group in the comparison shown in the artwork – 5-6 year olds), n = 6. 
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Discussion 
Our study used dynamic systems to examine second-order ToM development. Results 
show that a hyperlogistic model fits the empirical data for second-order ToM comprehension 
and prediction, suggesting that second-order ToM growth follows a dynamic growth rule. 
Furthermore, support appears to have a substantial effect for the 5-6 year olds when they have 
to predict their opponent’s behavior (i.e., prediction tests), compared to their peers who did 
not receive it. 
In contrast to the Wellman, Cross and Watson’s meta‑ analysis (2001, i.e., having to 
predict an action that follows from a belief is no more difficult than identifying the belief 
itself) our study showed that comprehension might be the precursor through which children 
develop the ability to predict future behaviours or mental states. Thus, a circular mechanism 
may account for our results (see Figure 2). Our goal was to empirically demonstrate that a 
dynamic system framework already used in other developmental contexts (see for instance 
Steenbeek & Van Geert, 2008) can be used to explain the dynamics involved in ToM 
development. Although Steenbeek and Van Geert’s model is not mathematically 
implemented in the present study (i.e., we used two dynamic models derived from a 
hyperlogistic dynamic law to fit the two variables separately), it allows us to explain the 
dynamics involved in a social context where ToM is utilised.  As for Figure 2, the 
environmental condition ‘with support’ (i.e., the experimenter, one of the agents) provides 
fundamental ToM comprehension strategies to a 5-6 years old child (the second agent in the 
dyad); this in turn has a facilitatory effect for the planning of strategies to be actively used to 
predict one’s thoughts or behaviour. Later on these strategies have a retroactive effect (i.e. ex 
post facto) on the environmental interaction (i.e., agents adapts to the child’s ToM level); this 
is implicitly ‘tuned’ to the current child’s ToM level, (e.g. a more complex level of ToM 
prediction and/or comprehension). 
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Support provides the necessary scaffoldings for developing a cognitive component 
that allows for a quicker and better prediction of second-order mental states. However, it is 
debated whether this might be strictly ToM-based or the result of EFs developing at around 
the age of 6. A number of accounts have been proposed to explain the relationship between 
ToM development and EFs, amongst which proposal discuss that ToM may be the precursor 
for EFs or vice versa (Moses & Tahiroglu, 2010; Perner & Lang, 1999; Moses & Carlson, 
2004; Sabbagh et al., 2006), as well as suggesting that ToM makes the use of EFs 
components (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998), particularly when this is necessary for the 
prediction of mental states. Support plays a crucial role in learning to use second-order ToM 
prediction, and could be used as a control parameter, along with others reflecting Piagetian 
processes within the individual (i.e., assimilation and accommodation) and contextual 
parameters in a Vygotskian perspective (i.e., actual development and zone of proximal 
development). A future implementation based on the Steenbeek’s and Van Geert’s (2008; see 
also Van Geert, 1998, 2000) may be used to predict and describe potential performance 
outcomes under different environmental/contextual conditions and ToM components (i.e., 
level of recursion, dimension: comprehension/prediction). 
One limitation of our study was not to use third order tests to assess if the support 
supplied could be benefited from the 10-11 years olds; this would have allowed a comparison 
with the 5-6 years olds had this been observed in the older age group. For instance, further 
regressions may have been observed in the older age group if more complex tests were used 
(see for instance Perner & Wimmer, 1985). However, this does not affect the relevance of our 
findings that show a clear change in the ability to use second-order ToM prediction more 
efficiently when 5-6 year old children are confronted with an unfamiliar task such as the 
ability to explicitly predict future mental states. 
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Development of second-order prediction appears to make use of a more explicit form 
of ToM, since an individual must be actively engaged in the estimation of a future mental 
state, rather than understanding a mental state, which may presume a more passive process 
(i.e., comprehension). It is therefore not surprising that at the age of 6 EFs undergo a 
remarkable stage of maturation and that this may have important implications for the 
development of ToM (Brocki & Bohlin, 2004; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002). For 
instance, some authors have suggested that EFs may also be a prerequisite for the acquisition 
of explicit ToM (Moses, 2001; see also Devine & Hughes, 2014). 
Furthermore, differences found in our results between the ability to understand past 
mental states (as reported in a story) or to predict future mental states (as emerging through 
PC games), may suggest that at this age the dip found in the false belief understanding might 
be explained as a result of the emergence of the ability to use ToM more explicitly. For 
instance, this may include the ability to use ToM through time, whereby ToM can be used 
forwards (i.e., to predict), but also backwards (i.e., to comprehend a mental state). This higher 
mastery of ToM may also contribute to the temporary conflict between competence and 
performance (Marcus, 2004): the development of second-order prediction of mental states 
interferes with second-order comprehension. 
Since both comprehension and prediction were fitted separately with a dynamic 
function that comprises a growth factor (𝑟′) and a limit capacity only (K – the maximum 
obtainable performance), their interaction was not implemented. Steenbeek and Van Geert’s 
(2008; see also Van Geert & Steenbeek, 2005ab) agent model for the development of social 
interaction (used in this study to interpret our results; see Figure 2) may provide the necessary 
groundwork for future studies to implement models of interaction including both agents as 
well as different ToM dimensions and interactions. For example, the change in one variable 
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will be related to the change in another variable in a bidirectional manner, which is a core 
characteristic of coupled systems. 
In summary, the current study demonstrated that second-order ToM can be fitted by a 
dynamic rule and that when support was provided this seemed to compensate for the 
depletion of cognitive resources associated with performing second-order tasks, particularly 
for the prediction dimension. These results support the idea that environment and interactions 
among different ToM dimensions can be conceived as control parameters and implemented in 
a more complex dynamic system. 
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